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Abstract
This paper shows that the presence of conditional staging in R&D (Research &
Development) has a critical impact on portfolio risk, and changes diversification
arguments when a portfolio is constructed. When R&D projects exhibit option-
like characteristics, correlation between projects plays a more complicated role than
traditional portfolio diversification would suggest. Real option theory argues that re-
search projects with conditional phases have option-like risk and return properties,
and are different from unconditional projects. We show that although the risk of a
portfolio always depends on the correlation between projects, a portfolio of condi-
tional R&D projects with real option characteristics has fundamentally different risk
than a portfolio of unconditional projects. When conditional R&D projects are neg-
atively correlated, portfolio risk is hardly reduced by diversification. When projects
are positively correlated, however, diversification is more effective than these tools
predict.
Key words: Real Options; Research & Development (R&D); Risk Management;
Monte Carlo
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1 Introduction
If the outcomes of a firm's endeavors are unknown, a key strategy to deal with
such risk is betting on more than one horse. Successful R&D policy there-
fore requires the selection and development of several concurrent alternatives,
known as diversification. Additionally, in order to timely abandon unprofitable
projects, R&Dmanagement often involves breaking an individual R&D project
into stages, so that certain requirements must be met before it can enter the
next development phase. The sequential nature then brings conditionality to
the project and causes R&D projects to exhibit option-like behavior, which
complicates the diversification argument. This paper examines diversification
when conditional staging is present in an R&D portfolio, and shows that re-
liance on traditional diversification arguments can be quite misleading. As
compared to diversification of traditional (unconditional) projects, condition-
ally staged projects are less sensitive to changes in correlation and risk is
therefore more difficult to diversify. Our results show that negative correla-
tion amongst conditionally staged projects makes diversification a less effective
instrument to eliminate risk than for unconditional projects. Positive corre-
lation amongst conditionally staged projects, however, makes diversification
more effective.
Real options analysis has become a well-established R&D project valuation
technique for intertemporal risky investments in R&D. Rooted in financial the-
ory, Myers (1977) was the first to describe real options as the opportunities to
purchase real assets on possibly favorable terms. In their seminal paper, Black
and Scholes (1973) consider equity of a real, levered firm as an option on its
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entity value. In the strategy literature, Bowman and Hurry (1993) and Bettis
and Hitt (1995) propose real options theory as an alternative lens for looking at
technology investments that closely resemble the behavior and characteristics
of real options. In the R&D literature, Thomke (1997) indeed shows empiri-
cally that flexibility under uncertainty allows firms to continuously adapt to
change and improve products. Hartmann and Hassan (2006) provide empiri-
cal evidence that real option analysis is used as an auxiliary valuation tool 1
in pharmaceutical project valuation. In this context, a basic implementation
is provided by Kellogg and Charnes (2000), and more sophisticated option
valuation models for pharmaceutical research have been developed by Loch
and Bode-Greuel (2001). Lee and Paxson (2001) view the R&D process and
subsequent discoveries as sequential (compound) exchange options. Cassimon
et al. (2004) provide an analytical model to value the phased development of
a pharmaceutical R&D project. The empirical literature also confirms that
R&D yields the positively skewed distribution of returns that is typical for
options. For instance, Scherer & Harhoff (2000) show that the top 10% of
the investigated inventions and innovations captured 48 to 93 percent of total
sample returns. They refer to Nordhaus (1989), who postulates that 99.99%
of the tens of thousands of invention patents issued each year are worthless,
but that the remaining 0.01% have high values.
1 The fundamental difference between real options and traditional Discounted Cash
Flow (DCF) valuation lies in the flexibility to adapt when circumstances change.
Whereas DCF valuation fixes an investment decision once and for all, an option
is the right (not the obligation) to invest in R&D at some future date. If future
circumstances are favorable, the option will be exercised; if not, the option will
expire without any further cost. Such freedom of choice enables an investor to timely
abandon the project so that further losses are avoided. Therefore, many unfavorable
investments (with limited downside risk) can be financed by a few highly profitable
investments (with unlimited upside potential). Profitable investments will account
for the majority of returns, so the return distribution becomes positively skewed.
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In concurrence with these findings, we analyze conditionally staged (uncondi-
tional) projects as financial options (equity shares). Such R&D typically has
a high (low) chance of failure and can be deemed risky (low-risk). High-risk
projects in R&D are by and large of an explorative nature: examples are basic
and fundamental research, or R&D in response to (or in anticipation of) im-
portant changes in a firm's strategic environment. Low-risk projects in R&D
are most often of an incremental nature: examples are `me-too' inventions
that imitate a successful competitor's invention, or investments in (or varia-
tions of, or incremental changes to) an already commercialized product. We
will refer to these projects by conditionally staged and unconditional projects,
respectively.
Although most real options studies have primarily examined projects in iso-
lation, Engwall (2003) argues that every project takes off from, or is executed
in, an organizational context. Real options should therefore also be considered
as part of a portfolio. Brosch (2001) contemplates on the influence of inter-
acting real options within projects. These positive and negative interactions
between options make a portfolio's value non-additive. Our focus, however, is
on option interactions between projects, and we focus on the risk of the port-
folio. Smith and Thompson (2003, 2005) postulate a project selection strategy
in sequential petroleum exploration, where the outcome of the prior drillings
can be observed before investing in the next drilling. We are also involved
with real option selection, but focus on simultaneous (non-sequential) devel-
opment. Multiple assets have been examined by Wörner et al. (2002, 2003),
who describe a firm that conducts several R&D projects as a `basket option',
or an option on a set of stochastic variables. Yet, as they focus on the value
of a single claim that pertains to many random variables, their analysis does
not derive results for portfolio management (which inherently deals with the
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selection between multiple claims). In our argument below, we examine condi-
tional projects (or firms) and how their individual risk- and return properties
affect the overall risk of a portfolio.
When constructing an R&D portfolio, the selection of candidates comprises
many important, non-monetary considerations: for example, Prencipe and Tell
(2001) show that firms try to capture synergies that stem from learning pro-
cesses. Several studies have therefore aimed to integrate risk diversification
with expected costs and benefits, inter-project synergies, externalities, R&D
quality and overall fit with the business strategy. In this tradition, Linton,
Walsh, and Morabito (2002) developed a framework that combines both quan-
titative and qualitative measures to rank and select the projects in a portfolio.
Furthermore, Martino (1995) describes several methods for R&D project se-
lection including cluster analysis, cognitive modeling, simulation, portfolio op-
timization, and decision theory. While these sources are suitable for handling
technical and physical diversification, they seem less appropriate for allocat-
ing financial resources than the Markowitz (1952) diversification argument.
Markowitz's principle is to minimize risk given a return, or vice versa. Chien
(2002) includes a survey of selection procedures and shows that several origi-
nated from Markowitz's work 2 . Unfortunately, Markowitz diversification only
works when the distribution of project returns is symmetric; an assumption
that is violated for R&D projects with conditionality. Our argument sup-
plements the Markowitz criterion in that it explicitly considers real option
characteristics 3 .
Using a portfolio of two investment opportunities, we show that although the
2 A recent R&D selection model that is based on Markowitz's can be found in
Ringuest et al. (2004).
3 By simulating many real options, we create a skewed distribution.
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risk of an R&D portfolio always depends on the correlation between projects,
the dependence differs between conditional projects with real options and un-
conditional projects. In particular, we find that when projects are positively
correlated, the overall portfolio risk for conditional projects is lower than for
unconditional projects. Diversification is an important argument to motivate
a portfolio of such projects, because it is more effective than one would expect
from unconditional investments. When, in contrast, projects are negatively
correlated, we find that the overall portfolio risk for conditional projects is
higher than for unconditional projects. Moreover, under negative correlation,
portfolio risk is less sensitive to changes in correlation as compared to un-
conditional investment projects. Diversification is therefore less effective than
one would initially expect from unconditional investments, and more weight
should be placed on non-diversification arguments to motivate a portfolio of
such projects, such as synergies and spillovers.
Our results are relevant for public policy to allocate resources and effectively
spur innovation 4 : the risk of a group of positively correlated start-ups 5 is
lower than one would expect if conditionality is ignored. Hence, diversification
may still be a good argument for grouping innovative companies, as risk is more
effectively reduced than within industries with a more stable cash flow. At the
same time, our results are relevant to the investment portfolio of a single firm:
when positively correlated projects are still young and in the R&D phase,
a portfolio consisting of such projects is less risky than one would expect.
4 For instance, a (regional or federal) government may want to develop a geograph-
ical region, or stimulate research in a certain area. Does a government want to focus
in order to create a specialized technology area such as Silicon Valley, or does it
want to diversify in order to prevent overdependence on a few industries such as
construction and car manufacturing in Detroit?
5 Especially in an innovative field, a start-up is a risky business, often with option
characteristics.
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But as successful projects mature, uncertainty resolves over time, and option
characteristics become less relevant, the same correlation between projects
leads to more risk. To minimize overall portfolio risk, some of the matured
projects may therefore be sold in exchange for negatively correlated projects
with low-risk.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, the theory behind a portfolio
of real options is conveyed. In Section 3 we present the model and its results,
and answer the question why pharmaceutical firms focus instead of diversify
by using our model. In Section 4, we discuss managerial implications and
conclude. In the Appendices A and C, a proof of our findings is provided, as
well as a means to extend our analysis to a more realistic setting.
2 Conceptual Framework
An opportunity to invest can turn out favorably or unfavorably. In the first
case the investor makes a profit, and otherwise he looses no more than the
initial amount invested. Such limited liability causes the investor's payoff struc-
ture to be non-linear, and further investment is conditional on a positive value
development in the future. This is the key characteristic of a financial option.
The familiar payoff structure of both the investor and an individual Euro-
pean option at maturity is shown in Figure 1A: if the stock is valued at less
than the investment (equal to $1) , the call is worthless. The exercise price is
analogous to the present value of the investment that is made after the initial
investment to acquire the option. If the stock price is larger than $1, its value
rises one-to-one with increases in the stock price. The stock price is analogous
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Figure 1. Return on an individual call option and on a population of call options
Consider the following call option: each option costs 1$ in exchange for the
right (not the obligation) to buy the common stock at a fixed price, here being
also 1$. The individual option is worthless when the price of the stock is 1$
or below. The distribution of option returns is truncated: any return value
below -1$ is impossible. Figure 1a shows the value of a single call option at
expiration. Figure 1b shows the return distribution of a population of call
option returns, where the shaded part is truncated.
to the present value of the project's cash flows 6 . So at expiration the project
value can either be zero, or larger than zero.
Figure 1B shows what this means for a large portfolio of calls, which is a valid
way to describe reality if the portfolio's constituents behave similar to finan-
cial options, i.e., if a portfolio consists entirely of conditionally staged projects
as often found in pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, venture capital and software
technology. Since negative values are impossible to obtain, a distribution of
returns that would otherwise be normal now becomes truncated from the left:
when the underlying stock is not worth the exercise price, the option will re-
main unexercised. Therefore, the shaded area of the distribution is nonexistent
and the distribution seizes to be symmetrical 7 .
6 The analogy holds also for the other variables that are needed to calculate the
value of an option: the variance of stock is analogous to the project's cash flow
volatility, and the time to maturity is analogous to the investor's time available to
defer a next investment. The risk-free rate represents the time value of money in
both the real and financial setting.
7 Because the value of a project is a random variable and the option value on the
project is a convex function of the project value, it is known that
E[OV (x)] > OV (E[x])
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If the projects are without conditional staging, the shaded area would exist,
the distribution would be symmetrical and by a 'perfect hedge', a riskless
portfolio can be created: when two equity shares are perfectly negatively cor-
related, one goes down by an equal amount if the other goes up and vice
versa 8 , so that all deviation is offset. In line with Markowitz (1952), we call
this hedging mechanism the diversification effect on the risk of a portfolio.
However, if the projects are conditionally staged, project values are option-
like distributed, above-average returns are no longer offset by below-average
returns and Markowitz's (1952) diversification principle is no longer valid.
Because the payoff from a call cannot fall below zero, the option already pro-
vides insurance against the negative payoffs by nullifying those payoffs that
are lower than the exercise price. As a consequence, these would-be-negative
payoffs are no longer available for diversification, and constructing a riskless
portfolio is no longer possible. In a portfolio of options, paradoxically, the
key characteristic of an option limits downside risk of the individual project,
but complicates diversification and increases risk of the portfolio. In line with
Jensen's Inequality, we call this the `convexity effect', which may partly offset
the diversification effect. In Appendix A, we derive this result as we examine
the variance of a conditionally staged portfolio more explicitly.
In the next section, we will develop a Monte Carlo simulation model to show
the effect of risky projects on a portfolio of R&D projects. The procedure is
straightforward and can easily be used in practice with other portfolio selec-
tion criteria. But before we proceed, a proper definition of the key concepts is
where OV is the value of the option and x is the project value. In this particular
case, this means that the expected value of the option on the project is larger than
an option on the expected value of the project. This inequality is known as Jensen's
Inequality, and is caused by the nonlinear transformation of an option value on some
underlying asset.
8 That is, when uncertainty is constant and equal for both shares.
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appropriate. This paper is focused on the risk of a portfolio, and is therefore
a supplement to other portfolio selection criteria we already mentioned. Their
importance notwithstanding, for the sake of argument we group all these cri-
teria under the name of non-diversification criteria. The uncertainty in our
portfolio is completely determined by how the market value of projects devel-
ops: we confine our analysis to the relation between market values of projects,
and assume the project costs to be independent and known. We prefer this
setup because modelling more than one uncertainty would cause our results to
become confounded. For more realistic settings, the procedure can be easily
extended to accommodate two or more related stochastic processes such as
uncertain costs and benefits.
3 Methodology and Results
3.1 Simulation Model
To find the volatility of an option portfolio, we need to estimate the volatility of
payoffs for each option. The payoffs can be found by examining the lognormal
value distribution of market prices for R&D projects, which are assumed to
follow a geometric Brownian motion.
We start with two projects i{1, 2}. Unless we consider the special cases in
Appendix A, it is not possible to determine the risk of an option portfolio ana-
lytically because the joint distribution of options is not analytically tractable.
We therefore model the behavior of both end-of-R&D values projects Vi by a
simple normal distribution 9 , defined as follows:
9 Our results also persist for other models of behavior.
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Vi = µi + σiεi (1)
where µi is the project value, σi is the standard deviation of project values and
εi is a random draw from a standard normal distribution. For each project i,
we calculate the option value OVi:
OVi = max[Vi −Xi, 0]e−rT (2)
where Xi is the investment, needed to start or acquire the project. To find the
volatility of an option, we repeat equations 1 and 2 R times and see how its
values are distributed:
σOVi =
√
1
R
∑
r
(OVir −OVi)2 (3)
When both projects are technically related, samples need to be drawn from
a bivariate standard normal distribution and the relatedness between market
values is measured by means of a correlation coefficient ρ12 between ε1 and ε2.
Hull (2006) describes how a bivariate standardized normal distribution can be
constructed through Cholesky decomposition. For each simulation round, in-
dependent samples y1 and y2 are taken from a univariate standardized normal
distribution and the correlated samples ε1and ε2are calculated as follows:
ε1= y1 (4)
ε2= ρ12y1 + y2
√
1− ρ212 (5)
From one set of independent samples y1 and y2, we generate 21 pairs of corre-
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lated samples ε1 and ε2 (ranging from ρ12 = −1.0 to ρ12 = 1.0 with step size
0.10) by plugging in the independent sample values in equations 4 and 5 10 .
Because the value of a portfolio is simply the sum of the projects i,
pf =
∑
i
OVi, (6)
the risk of the portfolio can be defined for each correlated sample ε1and ε2,
similar to the variance of the option value. An estimate of this variance is
based on a simulation of portfolios and averaging over R:
σˆpf=
√
1
R
∑
r
(pfr − pf)2. (7)
3.2 Simulation Results
Figure 2 compares the cumulative variance of two unrelated, but otherwise
identical options (i.e. equation 3, the dotted line σ20 = σ
2
1 + σ
2
2 where ρ12 = 0)
with 21 option pairs, which are related to a greater or less degree (i.e. equation
7, the solid, curved line). We observe that at ρ = 0, the variance of the option
portfolio (the solid line σ2pf ) is equal to the risk of the two unrelated projects
σ20: a portfolio of completely unrelated options is identical to options that are
both separate and unrelated. In this situation, the projects are identical in
value and in risk.
To illustrate the difference between the actual portfolio risk and the calculated
10Usually, a triangular matrix needs to be constructed that represents a consistent
variance-covariance matrix (VCV). In the two-variable case, however, this is not
necessary because any correlation structure between two variables is consistent as
long as the correlation is between -1 and 1.
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risk when using Markowitz, we have added a third, dashed line σ˜2pf that shows
the variance of the projects if we assume Markowitz diversification to be valid.
This would be appropriate if the separate projects would be unconditional and
behave as equity shares. To construct the three lines, the following well-known
formula to calculate portfolio variance is used:
σ21&2 = σ
2
1 + σ
2
2 + 2ρσ1σ2 (8)
The difference lies in the interpretation of the correlation coefficient ρ (the hor-
izontal line σ20 illustrates the degenerate case where ρ is zero), which measures
the correlation between projects. In case of the naively calculated variance
σ˜2pf , the projects are correlated one-to-one with the projects' market values
and ρ is a constant. In case of the correct variance σ2pf , however, co-movement
between real option projects is a function of market value and the probability
that a project is terminated 11 . A manager that doesn't recognize real option
characteristics would end up calculating risk naively, and Figure 2 illustrates
how naively calculated risk may differ from correctly simulated risk .
In the Figure, the naive portfolio variance at ρ = 0 equals the simulated
variance of the portfolio and the separate options. We also see that both σ˜2pf
and σ2pf are reduced when projects are less then perfectly positively correlated,
and that two perfectly positively correlated projects have a variance of 200%
compared to σ20, as proven in Appendix A. When the projects are negatively
correlated, both σ˜2pf and σ
2
pf are less then σ
2
0. These are all diversification
effects in line with the theory posed by Markovitz.
11 This fact has also been used in the theoretical derivations of our results in Ap-
pendix A.
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Figure 2. Simulation Results for Two Identical Investment Opportunities
Each trial generates two random samples y1 and y2 and, subsequently, two
option values. Simultaneously, option values are calculated for increasing cor-
relation increments, ranging from 1.0 to + 1.0. Apart from the risk-free rate,
all elements are assumed to follow their own, distinctive process. All other
parameters are set as follows:
Number of Trials: n = 50, 000
Number of Options: i = 2
Project Market Value: V1 = V2 = 20
Investment: X1 = X2 = 25
Volatility: σ1 = σ2 = 5
Time to Maturity: T1 = T2 = 18 months
Risk-free rate: r = 5%
The `convexity effect', however, limits the most severe value drops but leaves
all positive development intact, so that project payoffs are non-linear and the
value distribution becomes skewed. Figure 2 and Appendix A both show that
when the value dynamics of individual projects can no longer be offset, naively
applying Markowitz diversification may lead to significant miscalculations of
risk. This is caused by the interaction between diversification and convexity
effects, which has both positive and negative consequences. When projects are
positively correlated, the cushioning of convexity enhances diversification and
overall risk becomes lower than under Markowitz. But when the projects are
negatively correlated, the cushioning of convexity hampers the diversification
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effect, leading to a less effective hedge. As a consequence, options are more
complex instruments for diversification than stock. In terms of the effect that
correlation has on risk, the sensitivity of unconditional risk to changes in
correlation is generally smaller than for unconditional risk, up to a correlation
of about ρ = 0.70: especially for negatively correlated projects, diversification
is hardly changing the portfolio's risk. Stated more precisely, the variance of a
conditionally staged portfolio is compressed towards the cumulative variance
for two independent options. The range of a conditionally staged portfolio
is smaller than the range of an unconditional portfolio, but the minimum
is higher than the unconditional portfolio's minimum. We can formulate the
following hypotheses:
H1: Under positive correlation, conditionally staged projects diversify risk
better than unconditional projects.
H2: Under negative correlation, unconditional projects diversify risk better
than conditionally staged projects.
3.3 Robustness Analysis and General Applicability
The base case (Figure 2) shows what happens when two simple and identical
options are out of the money: the investment hasn't been recovered yet. This
setting is typical for many R&D projects. Figures 3a-d show results of sim-
ulated options that have a lower volatility (Figure 3a), a different volatility
(Figure 3b), are at the money (Figure 3c) or in the money (Figure 3d). In
all these situations, the convexity-effect persists. In Figure (a), we halve the
volatility so that the project is not in the money until the value equals µ+2σ.
In R&D, this means that the project is not continued in about 97.5% of the
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cases and hardly any of these projects is available for risk diversification. As
a consequence, the diversification effect is almost absent and all we see is the
convexity effect: we might just as well not diversify at all. As a less extreme
case, when volatilities differ, Figure (b) shows that portfolio risk is less sen-
sitive to changes in correlation than in Figure 2 and diversification is still
quite ineffective. Please note the unit change on the y-axis, indicating that in
this case, zero variance can not be achieved by naive calculation either. When
the moneyness increases in Figure (c) and (d), the curves move towards the
straight line and our results become less distinct. This reflects the familiar fact
that options that are deeply in the money will behave similarly to the underly-
ing stock. As a consequence, the convexity effect becomes less pronounced and
the diversification effect starts to dominate. In R&D, this means that if the
value of the project is much higher then its costs, conditional staging doesn't
make a large difference because the project will be exercised anyway.
A few general remarks are in order here. Many projects are funded by multiple
finance or subsidy rounds and our simple calls represent the last phase. The
pharmaceutical industry, for example, is typically characterized by six stages
of development. This means that the condition of completing the sixth phase
is conditional upon completion of the fifth phase, which is conditional on the
fourth phase, etcetera. These more realistic features can easily be modeled
by using compound options in the simulation. In the compounded case, we
are stacking `effect on effect'. This is not demonstrated here, because such
simulation results are highly dependent on the success of entering the next
round: such arbitrarily chosen input parameters (especially for several stages)
will have a critical influence on the portfolio variance and conceal the con-
vexity effect. Compound options can easily be put to practice by means of
Cassimon et al. (2004), who have developed a closed-form model for the suc-
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Figure 3. Sensitivity Analysis of Simulation Results
Figure (a) shows a volatility of 2.5 instead of 5 for both options.
Figure (b) shows a volatility of 4 and 6 for each instead of 5 for both options.
Figure (c) shows a project value of 25 instead of 20.
Figure (d) shows a project value of 30 instead of 20.
All other option parameters are identical to the base case in Figure 2.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
cessive phases from R&D to commercialization. Likewise, simulation makes it
straightforward to implement other realistic features such as uncertain costs
or time-to-completion. That, however, would also drive us away from the es-
sential portfolio diversification problem.
For ease of exposition, we have limited the analysis to the smallest portfolio
possible, a portfolio of two projects. The effect is also observable when we
increase the number of assets. If we introduce a third asset and keep the
step size fixed at 0.10, for example, then 21 correlated samples are ranked
similarly for every random variable. So for the 3-variable case we have a grid
of 21 correlation points between variable 1 and 2, 21 between 1 and 3 and
21 between 2 and 3. Appendix B describes how to develop the simulation
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procedure for three and more projects by constructing a consistent correlation
structure 12 .
3.4 Implications
The implications of our results can be readily applied in any research policy
that concerns simultaneous development. While various applications may il-
lustrate the use of our findings, we give an example that originates from the
pharmaceutical industry. In this sector, many small firms succesfully focus on
a few drugs, rather than become part of a portfolio of a large, diversified com-
pany. Why is risk diversification not necessary for small research ventures to
be successful in such risky business? One argument would be that in the early
stages of development, economies of scale (e.g. in marketing) are not feasible
yet. Another would be that the R&D process is differently organized for small
ventures than for big companies. Our results give an additional argument for
this behavior: a strong focus only marginally increases the risk of the portfolio
while it may strongly contribute to non-diversification criteria (such as syn-
ergies and spillovers) and preserve the upward potential. We also provide an
argument in favor of active portfolio management: as portfolios need restruc-
turing when projects evolve and become less risky, the venture may be sold to
a diversified company.
If conditionally staged projects are positively correlated, their combined value
is less volatile than standard portfolio theory might suggest. Portfolio risk is
12At the same time, the number of possible correlations is smaller than 63. If, for
instance, two projects c1 and c2 have a negative correlation of 0.99, the third cannot
be highly correlated with both at the same time. In this three-variable case, the
correlation between c1 and c2 and a third, single option can only be defined on the
complete interval [-1, 1] when the correlation of the two projects c1 and c2 is held
constant at ρ = 0.
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likely to be overestimated because the diversification effect is cushioned by the
convex nature of options. In terms of diversification, these projects are good
candidates for portfolio selection. If, conversely, drug development projects
are negatively correlated and the uncertainty is high enough to let progress be
conditionally staged, then the cushioning of convexity causes diversification to
be less effective than would be expected from Markowitz. As time progresses,
the results of these R&D programs improve and become less uncertain, the
cushioning disappears and the projects will behave more stock-like. In these
later stages, diversification becomes more important in portfolio selection as
the risk becomes more sensitive to changes in correlation.
It may be useful to provide examples of positively and negatively corre-
lated risk as well. Positively correlated risk can partly be ascribed to non-
diversifiable market risk. Another part may be ascribed to the medical context,
where positively correlated projects may represent two or more drug develop-
ment programs projects that will lead to `complementary treatment' of illness:
a first example is the case for the treatment of HIV, where (due to mutations)
any mono-therapy is not able to suppress an HIV-infection and a combination
of three drugs is prescribed. When the side effects of one drug become less
severe, or if the effectiveness of one drug improves, the value of the other two
drugs will increase as well, because the quality of the treatment increases. As
a second example, we can think of drugs that treat disorders that are strongly
related such as lung cancer and cardiovascular diseases. Often, both are the
result of a common cause such as an unhealthy lifestyle. When patients can
be treated for one disease, the patient will live longer and the odds increase
that he will suffer from the second disease. Ironically, this is good news for in-
vestors as the market value of both drugs increases. An example of negatively
correlated risk lies in two drug development programs that are substitutes:
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if the value of one program goes up due to a major discovery, the value of
the other project automatically goes down (for instance, when two develop-
ment programs aim to cure similar diseases). The risk of negatively correlated
projects is only marginally lower in a portfolio than for independent projects.
Therefore, although non-diversifcation arguments may provide good reason to
combine these projects, risk reduction isn't one of them. Until the projects
mature and risk has been diminished, negatively correlated risky projects are
less attractive portfolio candidates for risk management.
We consider the pharmaceutical industry to be a well-chosen example for its
active portfolio management also. It is evident that corporate risk diminishes
as new ventures reach maturity. In Figure 1, our framework indicates that ven-
tures first behave as the curvature, and later behave as the straight, dotted line.
The gentle slope of the curve shows that although the risk of positively cor-
related ventures is still higher than the risk of negatively correlated ventures,
the difference doesn't matter as much as standard portfolio theory predicts.
Therefore, structuring a portfolio to minimize variance is not as important
in the early stages. When ventures mature, however, diversification becomes
more important and the risk characteristics of positively and negatively cor-
related ventures become more pronounced. It may be wise to sell positively
correlated ventures in this stage.
4 Conclusion and Future Research Directions
In this article we have shown that the presence of conditional staging in R&D
invalidates diversification arguments when a portfolio is constructed. Under
negative correlation, emphasis should be placed on other (non-diversification)
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arguments when constructing a portfolio whereas under positive correlation,
the advantages of diversification are larger than one may expect fromMarkowitz
diversification. We have also demonstrated that due to the convexity of high-
risk projects, the sensitivity of portfolio risk to correlation is smaller for high-
risk projects than for low-risk projects.
Implementation of our model is straightforward, and shows that the difference
in risk between high-risk and low-risk projects can be quite substantial: for
two negatively correlated risky projects of about ρ = −0.5, the uncertainty
is reduced by only 10%/50% = 20% as compared to low-risk uncertainty
reduction. For ρ = +0.5, the uncertainty is increased by only 30%/50% =
60% as compared to low-risk uncertainty. These differences can easily become
more dramatic (in extreme cases, diversification becomes impossible), and our
findings are robust to changes in the parameter structure of the model. We
have provided examples to show why this is important for the R&D portfolio
of a drug developer.
Some extensions to the model can make it more suitable to analyze portfolio
risk under more specific circumstances. One can easily construct a portfolio
with projects that differ in volatility, time to maturity and moneyness. We have
explained the possibility of compounding options when additional parameters
(such as success probabilities) are known. Using a provided algorithm, it is
easy to extend the analysis to a large portfolio, with each project having its
own distinct features such as the required investment outlay, estimated date of
completion and volatility of market value. The simulation procedure remains
the same for several underlying stochastic processes and may include other
case-specific peculiarities such as mean reversion, barriers or autocorrelation.
It is also possible to account for synergies on the cost side. Future research may
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hence yield similar results as ours, but from real-life data. For expositional
purposes, however, all these extensions would unnecessarily complicate our
argument.
An important implication that follows from our work is that, when evaluating
the risk of a portfolio of risky R&D opportunities, it is not sufficient to merely
examine the risk-return properties between projects: it is also important to
determine the presence of staged conditionality before drawing conclusions
on how appropriate a project is for reducing the risk of the portfolio. When
additional information is available on project parameters to tailor the model to
a specific problem, our framework could also be helpful in the formulation and
assessment of research and development policy by public and private parties.
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Appendix A: Explicit Derivation of Main Results
To examine the variance of a risky R&D portfolio more closely, an analytical
treatment of our theoretical framework will convey what happens when the
correlation is perfectly positive, negative or absent. Because of the nature of
options (i.e., the max operator), the variance of a single call option consists of
two properly weighted variances, namely one variance in case the call value is
positive  which we will denote by V ar(c+)  and one for the case the outcome
is zero:
V ar(max[V − I, 0]) = w1V ar(V − I) + w2V ar(0) = w1V ar(c+) (9)
where w1 and w2 are the appropriate weights. The key to an analytical deriva-
tion of the variances is recognizing the outcome possibilities that exist in each
of the three correlation scenarios, and construct a single variance from there,
using a variance decomposition formula that is defined as:
V ar(X) = E[V ar(X|Y )] + V ar(E[X|Y ]) (10)
We will consider a portfolio of two simple investment opportunities (calls) that
are exactly equal two each other. Both require an investment X that is, by
assumption, equal to the expected value of the project (for ease of notation,
we drop the subscript i that we introduced in Section 3.1):
X1 = X2 = X = E[VT ] (11)
As a consequence, for at the money options, each call will be distributed
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around E[VT ](again, we drop the subscript i):
Pr(VT > X|X = E[VT ]) = Pr(ε > 0) = 0.5; ε ∼ N(0, 1) (12)
Furthermore, since both calls are identical, we know that the probability of
being in the money is equal for both calls i, j:
Pr(Vi,T > X) = Pr(Vj,T > X) (13)
The cases of perfectly positive, negative or absent correlation differ only in
the correlation that exist between two projects, and each will yield a differ-
ent expression for the portfolio variance, as expressed in terms of the option
components' variance in 9.
Perfectly positively correlated projects
For ρ = 1, either both calls are in the money or both calls are out of the
money. This means that the portfolio consists of two possible outcomes:
Pf = (c+1 + c
+
2 |V1 > X, V2 > X) + (0|V1 < X, V2 < X)
Because of equation 12 and equation 13, each outcome is equally likely. In this
case (denoting the positive part of the portfolio by pf+ and the negative by
pf−), the variance composites on the right-hand side are:
V arpf+ =V ar(2c
+|V > X) = 4× V ar(c+|V > X)
V arpf− =0
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Furthermore, we know that E[pf+] = 2E[c+] since both projects are identical.
From equation 10, it follows that the portfolio variance of a portfolio is:
V ar(pf |ρ = 1)= 4V ar(c
+) + 0
2
+
(2E[c+]− E[c+])2 + (0− E[c+])2
2
=2× V ar(c+) + E[c+]2
Perfectly independent projects
For ρ = 0, we know from equation 12 and equation 13that each option can be
in the money or out of the money with equal probability. In this case, we can
therefore distinguish 4 possible outcomes :
Pf =(V1 −X|V1 > X, V2 < X)
+ (V2 −X|V1 < X, V2 > X)
+ (V1 −X + V2 −X|V1 > X, V2 > X)
+ (0|V1 < X, V2 < X)
The variance of the first two terms on the right hand side is equal to V ar(c+),
and the expected value for both is E[c+]. Since the non-linear payoff is ac-
counted for in the last term, we can use Markowitz to find the variance of the
third term, which is simply the sum of the variances V ar(c+1 ) and V ar(c
+
2 )
because ρ = 0. Furthermore, we know that the expected value of this term
equals the sum of the expected values E[c+1 ]and E[c
+
2 ]. It follows from equation
10 that
V ar(Pf |ρ = 0)= V ar(c
+) + V ar(c+) + 2var(c+) + 0
4
+
0 + 0 + (2E[c+]− E[c+])2 + (0− E[c+])2
4
=V ar(c+) + 0.5(E[c+])2
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This is exactly half of the variance found at ρ = +1, a finding that corresponds
with the simulation results.
Perfectly negatively correlated projects
For ρ = −1 and at the money options, we know that either one call or the
other is in the money. But because both projects can never jointly be in- or
out of the money at ρ = −1, this simply means that the variance is equal to
either the variance of one call, or that of the other. More precisely, we can
state that:
Pf =(c+1 + 0|V1 > X, V2 < X) + (0 + c+2 |V1 < X, V2 > X)
= c+1 = c
+
2 = c
+.
We can write the last line because the calls are identical under the given
conditions. It follows directly that we can write:
V ar(Pf |ρ = −1) = V ar(c+)
This demonstrates why in our results, the variance of a perfectly negatively
correlated portfolio doesn't go to 0% in the limit but is of a magnitude be-
tween zero and the variance at ρ = 0. Indeed, diversification under these
circumstances does not permit risk to be diversified away.
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Appendix B: How to Generate Random Samples from aMultivariate
Normal Distribution
In case a third stock enters our model, a third sample is drawn; ρ13 and ρ23
need to be defined in such a manner that the variances and covariance are
consistent, for instance, if asset 1 and asset 2 strongly move together as well
as asset 1 and 3 (i.e., the correlations ρ12 and ρ13 are highly positive), then the
dynamics of asset 2 and 3 need to be positively related to some extent (i.e., ρ23
needs to have a high positive value) as well. If we require 3 correlated samples
from normal distributions, the required samples are defined as follows:
ε1=α11x1 (14)
ε2=α21x1 + α22x1 (15)
ε3=α31x1 + α32x1 + α33x1
The Cholesky decomposition procedure sets α11 = 1 and requires α21 to be
chose such that α21α11 = ρ21 and α
2
21 + α
2
22 = 1. This yields
α21 = ρ21 (16)
and
α22 =
√
1− ρ221. (17)
For the third sample, α31 is to be chosen such that α31α11 = ρ31, yielding
α31 = ρ31. Then α32 is to be chosen such that
α31α21 + α32α22 = ρ32, (18)
29
leading to
α32 =
ρ32 − ρ12ρ13√
1− ρ212
. (19)
We conclude by the requirement that
α231 + α
2
32 + α
2
33 = 1, (20)
leading to
α33 =
√√√√√1− ρ213 − (ρ23 − ρ212ρ213√
1− ρ212
)2. (21)
We can simply generalize this case to n by expanding the Choleski matrix in
equation 15, for example to
ε4 = α41x1 + α42x2 + α43x3 + α44x4 (22)
and repeat this procedure. But correlations need to be chosen with more and
more care as the number of projects increases. In case of 2 projects, the re-
striction imposed by (B2) implies that ρ12 must be smaller than 1. Although
not very demanding in the two-variable case, the requirements above pose
more restrictions on the correlated projects for every project that enters the
simulation. We initially consider a single drug. If we want to simulate two
additional projects that both are correlated to this drug ρ12 = ρ13 = −0.9,
then these projects need to be positively correlated. More specifically, if we
let the third variable enter the simulation, it must satisfy:
α231 + α
2
32 + α
2
33 = 1 (23)
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or
α233 =
√
1− α231 − α232 =
√
1− 0.92 − α232 > 0. (24)
Hence, the Choleski-variable α232 must not be larger than (1 - 0.81 = ) 0.19
and
√
0.19 5 α32 5
√
0.19. (25)
Using this condition in the other requirement 18, we find the following range:
ρ23 ≤ 0.90× 0.90 + 0.19× 0.19=0.88
ρ23 ≥ 0.90× 0.90− 0.19× 0.19=0.62.
If a fourth project enters the story and ρ14 = ρ12 = ρ13 = −0.9, it is required
that
α244 =
√
1− α241 − α242 − α243 =
√
1− 0.92 − α242 − α243 > 0
and, similarly to equation 25, that
−α22 ≤ α42 + α43 ≤ α22,
meaning that α42 + α43 are subject to the same constrant as was α32. So
any newly entering simulation variable is subject to all previous constraints
plus 1. For instance, if we choose ρ42 = ρ32(so α42 = α32 and α41, α42, α43 =
α31, α32, α33), it must be true that
α44 =
√
1− α241 − α242 − α243 =
√
1− 0.81− 0.19− α243 > 0
and the fourth project needs to be uncorrelated with the others for consistency.
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